The CDM, as a project-based market mechanism, is by definition going to be fundamentally limited in both scope and geographic application.
A variety of options for sectoral approaches are under consideration for moving away from a project based approach with its additionality requirements. In addition, it has become very clear in retrospect that the large industrial gas projects which still count for a large share of the CERs on the market during this first period should in reality be dealt with legislatively rather than through the CDM.
Under the International Emissions Trading provisions, Annex I countries can trade so called 'Assigned Amount Units' AAUs among themselves, which are allocated to them at the beginning of each commitment period.
The emissions trading scheme, which is established in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, also foresees this to be 'supplemental to domestic actions' as a means of meeting the targets established for the Annex I parties. The total amount of allowable emissions for all Annex I countries the 'cap' has been proposed under the Kyoto Protocol. The scheme then allocates an amount of these emissions as 'allowances' to each of the Annex I parties the 'assigned amount'.
The assigned amount for any Annex I country is based on its emissions reduction target specified under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Those parties that reduce their emissions below the allowed level can then trade some part of their surplus allowances or 'AAUs' to other Annex parties. The 'transition economies', such as Russia, Ukraine and CEE countries, have a huge quantity of surplus AAUs in the first commitment period, which is largely as a result of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact economies in the early s.
As these surplus AAUs were not created from active emissions reductions, the EU and Japanese buyers have vowed not to purchase them from the region unless the AAU revenue is associated with some 'greening' activities. The surplus AAUs are now beginning to enter the market, with some CEE countries taking a lead in establishing the scheme.
The exact figure of the supply is hard to predict, however, as the biggest reserve of surplus AAU is in Russia, whose participation in the GIS is not yet clear. The system is being implemented in two trading periods. The first trading period ran from to The second trading period is set in parallel to the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol: it began on 1 January and runs until the end of A third trading period is expected to start in and to be implemented along with a reviewed ETS Directive.
It covers over 10, installations in the energy and industrial sectors which are responsible for about 50 per cent of EU's total CO 2 emissions and about 40 per cent of its total greenhouse gas emissions. The emission sources regulated under the system include combustion plants for power generation capacities greater than 20 MW , oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper. Discussions are under way on legislation to bring the aviation sector into the system from or EC, b.
The EU ETS is an emission allowance cap and trade system, that is to say it caps the overall level of emissions allowed but, within that limit, allows participants in the system to buy and sell allowances as they need. One allowance gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of CO 2. Currently, for each trading period under the system, Member States draw up national allocation plans NAPs which determine their total level of ETS emissions and how many emission allowances each installation in their country receives.
By allocating a limited number of allowances, below the current expected emissions level, Member States create scarcity in the market and generate a market value for the permits. A company that emits less than the level of their allowances can sell its surplus allowances. Those companies facing difficulties in keeping their emissions in line with their allowances have a choice between taking measures to reduce their own emissions or buying the extra allowances they need on the market.
The ETS Directive stipulates that at least 95 per cent of issued allowances should be given out for free by Member States for the period For the second trading period , this value is 90 per cent. The remaining percentage can be charged for, for example in an auction. This process, referred to as 'allocation', has been carried out using what is known as a 'grandfathering' approach, which is based on historical data emissions or production levels.
According to the 'Linking Directive', in addition to domestic action, Member States may also purchase a certain amount of credits from Kyoto flexible mechanisms projects CDM and JI to cover their emissions in the same way as ETS allowances.
The EU ETS has so far failed to achieve some of its main objectives, notably encouraging investment in clean technologies and the use of CO 2 emissions reduction certificates as a market signal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions Carbon Trust, ; Open Europe, As previously explained, in order to make sure that real trading emerges, Member States must make sure that the total amount of allowances issued to installations is less than the amount that would have been emitted under a business-as-usual scenario.
Actual verified emissions in showed allowances had exceeded emissions by about 80 million tonnes of CO 2 , equivalent to 4 per cent of the EU's intended maximum level Ellmerman and Buchner, This happened because government allocation had been based on over-inflated projections of economic growth and participants had a strong incentive to overestimate their needs ENDS Europe Report, The over-allocation of permits and the consequent collapse of CO 2 prices have hampered any initiative of clean technology investment, as it is clear that most companies regulated by the EU ETS didn't need to make any significant change to their production processes to meet the target they had been assigned Blanco and Rodrigues, The first phase of the EU ETS has shown that free allocation based on absolute historical emissions grandfathering causes serious distortions in competition by favouring de facto fossil-fuel generation EWEA, Costa Rica.
Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Trinidad and Tobago. This has the parallel benefits of stimulating green investment in developing countries and including the private sector in this endeavour to cut and hold steady GHG emissions at a safe level. It also makes leap-frogging—that is, the possibility of skipping the use of older, dirtier technology for newer, cleaner infrastructure and systems, with obvious longer-term benefits—more economical.
The Kyoto Protocol also established a rigorous monitoring, review and verification system, as well as a compliance system to ensure transparency and hold Parties to account. Under the Protocol, countries' actual emissions have to be monitored and precise records have to be kept of the trades carried out. Registry systems track and record transactions by Parties under the mechanisms. The UN Climate Change Secretariat, based in Bonn, Germany, keeps an international transaction log to verify that transactions are consistent with the rules of the Protocol.
Reporting is done by Parties by submitting annual emission inventories and national reports under the Protocol at regular intervals. A compliance system ensures that Parties are meeting their commitments and helps them to meet their commitments if they have problems doing so. Adaptation The Kyoto Protocol, like the Convention, is also designed to assist countries in adapting to the adverse effects of climate change.
It facilitates the development and deployment of technologies that can help increase resilience to the impacts of climate change. The Adaptation Fund was established to finance adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. In the first commitment period, the Fund was financed mainly with a share of proceeds from CDM project activities. In Doha, in , it was decided that for the second commitment period, international emissions trading and joint implementation would also provide the Adaptation Fund with a 2 percent share of proceeds.
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